Johnson v. Elk Lake Sch Dist by unknown
2002 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-1-2002 
Johnson v. Elk Lake Sch Dist 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2002 
Recommended Citation 
"Johnson v. Elk Lake Sch Dist" (2002). 2002 Decisions. 140. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2002/140 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2002 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
PRECEDENTIAL 
 
       Filed March 1, 2002 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 00-1549 
 
BETSY SUE JOHNSON, Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ELK LAKE SCHOOL DISTRICT; WAYNE STEVENS; 
CHARLOTTE A. SLOCUM; SCHOOL BOARD ELK LAKE 
SCHOOL DISTRICT 
 
On Appeal From the United States District Court 
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 96-cv-01471) 
District Judge: Honorable James F. McClure, Jr. 
 
Argued: September 6, 2001 
 
Before: BECKER, Chief Judge, ALITO and 
BARRY, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: March 1, 2002) 
 
       PETER G. LOFTUS, ESQUIRE 
        (ARGUED) 
       The Loftus Law Firm, P.C. 
       P.O. Box V, 1207 Main Street 
       Waverly, PA 18471 
 
       Counsel for Appellant 
 
 
  
       JEFFREY H. QUINN, ESQUIRE 
        (ARGUED) 
       Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C. 
       150 South Independence Mall, West 
       901 Public Ledger Building 
       Philadelphia, PA 19106 
 
       Counsel for Appellees Elk Lake 
       School District, Charlotte A. Slocum, 
       School Board Elk Lake School District 
 
       ROBERT A. MAZZONI, ESQUIRE 
       JULIA K. MUNLEY, ESQUIRE 
        (ARGUED) 
       Mazzoni & Karam 
       321 Spruce Street 
       Bank Towers, Suite 201 
       Scranton, PA 18503 
 
       Counsel for Appellee Wayne Stevens 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
This case arises out of plaintiff Betsy Sue Johnson's 
claim that her guidance counselor Wayne Stevens sexually 
harassed and abused her while she was a high school 
student in the Elk Lake School District. Johnson sought 
damages from Stevens in the District Court for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania, claiming violations of 42 U.S.C. 
S 1983 and state tort law. Johnson also sought damages 
from the School District, the Elk Lake School Board, and 
District Superintendent Charlotte Slocum (to whom we 
shall collectively refer as "the Administration"), claiming 
that they too were liable under S 1983 for having failed to 
prevent Stevens's abuse. 
 
In essence, Johnson asserted that the Administration 
knew or should have known of Stevens's propensity for 
sexual abuse, but was deliberately indifferent to this 
danger. The District Court granted summary judgment for 
the Administration, and Johnson appeals. Stevens too 
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moved for summary judgment, but his motion was denied, 
and a four-day trial ensued, after which a jury returned a 
unanimous verdict in his favor. Johnson moved for a new 
trial on the basis of alleged trial errors. The District Court 
denied this motion, which Johnson now also appeals. 
 
We agree with the District Court that Johnson has failed 
to adduce any credible evidence showing that Stevens's 
supervisors knew or should have known of any danger of 
abuse at a time at which they could have acted to prevent 
Johnson's injuries. Accordingly, we will affirm the District 
Court's order granting summary judgment for the 
Administration. The principal question arising out of the 
District Court's denial of the motion for a new trial is 
whether the Court abused its discretion in refusing to 
admit the testimony of Karen Radwanski, a former co- 
worker of Stevens, regarding a bizarre incident in which 
Stevens allegedly picked her up off the floor in another 
teacher's office and, in the course of doing so, touched her 
in the crotch area. Johnson had sought to present this 
testimony as evidence of Stevens's propensity for sexual 
abuse under Federal Rule of Evidence 415, which allows for 
the introduction of evidence of past sexual assaults in civil 
cases in which the claim for damages is predicated on the 
defendant's alleged commission of a sexual assault. 
 
In reviewing the District Court's ruling, we are called 
upon to consider, for the first time, the standards for 
admission of prior sexual misconduct evidence under Rule 
415. We conclude that in considering evidence of past 
sexual assaults, the trial court need not make a preliminary 
finding by a preponderance of the evidence under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 104(a) that the act in question qualifies as 
a sexual assault and that it was committed by the 
defendant. Rather, the court may admit the evidence so 
long as it is satisfied that the evidence is relevant, with 
relevancy determined by whether a jury could reasonably 
conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that the past 
act was a sexual assault and that it was committed by the 
defendant. See Fed. R. Evid. 104(b). 
 
We also conclude, however, that even when the evidence 
of a past sexual offense is relevant, the trial court retains 
discretion to exclude it under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 
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if the evidence's "probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence." We think that in cases where the 
past act is demonstrated with specificity and is 
substantially similar to the act(s) for which the defendant is 
being sued, it is Congress's intent that the probative value 
of the similar act be presumed to outweigh Rule 403's 
concerns. In a case such as this one, however, in which the 
evidence of the past act of sexual offense is equivocal and 
the past act differs from the charged act in important ways, 
we believe that no presumption in favor of admissibility is 
in order, and that the trial court retains significant 
authority to exclude the proffered evidence under Rule 403. 
We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in excluding Radwanski's testimony, and, finding 
that Johnson's other allegations of trial error are without 
merit, will affirm the District Court's order denying 
Johnson's motion for a new trial. 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
Johnson entered the Elk Lake School District high school 
as a freshman in September 1991. Sometime in November 
or December of that year Johnson began making regular 
visits to Stevens's office to discuss family difficulties. 
Johnson contends that shortly thereafter, in December 
1991, Stevens began sexually harassing and abusing her. 
She alleges that for the next two years Stevens repeatedly 
sent her letters, roses, cards, and other suggestive 
correspondence, attempted on numerous occasions to hug 
and kiss her without her consent, and at one point fondled 
her breasts and vagina. 
 
Johnson's complaint sought relief from both Stevens and 
the Administration for the violation of her civil rights under 
42 U.S.C. SS 1983, 1985, and 1986, as well as for the 
commission of the torts of conspiracy, negligence, assault 
and battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
The District Court dismissed Johnson's section 1985 and 
1986 claims as to all the defendants for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief could be granted. The Court also 
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dismissed Johnson's state tort claims against the 
Administration, concluding that such claims were barred by 
the Pennsylvania Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act, 42 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. SS 8541-64. Johnson does not appeal 
any of these dismissals. The District Court eventually 
granted summary judgment for the Administration with 
respect to the remaining S 1983 claim. The District Court 
denied Johnson's motion for reconsideration, and Johnson 
now appeals. We have examined the merits of Johnson's 
claim against the Administration and for the reasons given 
in the margin, we conclude that summary judgment was  
appropriate.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Because the gravamen of Johnson's claim against the Administration 
was that Stevens had violated her constitutional rights, we need not 
dwell on this claim in light of the jury verdict finding no constitutional 
or state tort law violations on the part of Stevens. Nevertheless, we note 
that Johnson presented no credible evidence demonstrating that school 
officials knew of the alleged risk of sexual abuse posed by Stevens at a 
time at which they could have prevented her alleged injuries. See Beers- 
Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 137 (3d Cir. 2001) (requiring plaintiff 
in a S 1983 action to demonstrate "that the defendant knew of the risk 
to the plaintiff before the plaintiff 's injury occurred"). She therefore 
has 
failed to establish, as she must under the Supreme Court's decision in 
Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 475 U.S. 469 
(1986), that her injuries were caused by a "policy or custom" of the 
Administration. Id. at 694. 
 
Johnson points to a conversation that took place between her sister, 
Lisa, and a guidance counselor, Jeffrey LaFrance, as evidence of the 
school's knowledge of Stevens's abuse. During this conversation Lisa 
remembers telling LaFrance that "something funny" was going on 
between her sister and Stevens, but she does not remember mentioning 
any specific allegations of sexual harassment or abuse. While it is fair 
to 
say that an allegation of "something funny" going on between a student 
and counselor should have been cause for concern on the part of 
LaFrance, we are unwilling to say that this allegation alone, without 
evidence of any specific mention of sexual harassment or abuse, put 
LaFrance on notice as to an ongoing constitutional violation by Stevens. 
Moreover, even if we thought that it did, this conversation would still 
fail 
to establish S 1983 liability on the part of the Administration because 
LaFrance, as a guidance counselor, does not qualify as the type of 
policy-making or supervisory official on account of whose inaction a 
municipality may be held liable under S 1983. See Pembaur v. City of 
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986). 
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Stevens also moved for summary judgment on Johnson's 
S 1983 claim against him, as well as on the state tort 
claims, but the District Court denied his motion. These 
claims were eventually tried before a jury, which returned 
a unanimous verdict in favor of Stevens. Following the 
verdict, Johnson filed a motion for a new trial in which she 
alleged three flaws in the way the trial had been conducted. 
The District Court rejected Johnson's motion for a new trial 
on all three grounds, two of which we address below and 
one which we describe in the margin.2 Johnson now 
appeals. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Alternatively, Johnson contends that even if the Administration was 
not aware of Stevens's abuse of her, it can be held liable for failing to 
respond to the danger posed by Stevens's well-known proclivity for 
sexually harassing and abusing female students. In other words, 
Johnson attempts to demonstrate that the Administration had a custom 
of being deliberately indifferent to Stevens's potential for committing 
constitutional violations, and that this "deliberate indifference" was the 
proximate cause of the injuries she sustained. See Beck v. City of 
Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 973-74 (3d Cir. 1996); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 
F.3d 1199, 1213 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
As evidence of Stevens's proclivity for sexual harassment, Johnson 
brought forth various stories and rumors about Stevens walking too 
closely to female students in the hallway, frequently calling female 
students out of class to his office, and giving gifts to female students. 
Even if all of these allegations were true, however, Johnson presented no 
evidence that they were ever brought to the attention of a supervisory or 
policy-making official of the administration either before or during (or 
even after) the time of Stevens's alleged abuse of Johnson. Moreover, 
even if school officials had been made aware of these stories before or 
during Stevens's alleged improper relationship with Johnson, we share 
the District Court's reluctance "to impose on the district an obligation 
to 
treat as true, all rumors, until proven otherwise." In the absence of any 
direct complaints made to school officials, the mere floating around of 
unsubstantiated rumors regarding a particular employee -- particularly 
in the high school setting, which is notoriously rife with adolescent 
gossip -- does not constitute the kind of notice for which a school 
district can be held liable under Monell's"policy or custom" requirement. 
 
2. During cross-examination, Johnson's counsel sought to question 
Stevens about having lied about making the dean's list in college on the 
resume he submitted when he first applied for a job with the Elk Lake 
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First, Johnson alleges that the District Court erred by not 
declaring a mistrial when Stevens's counsel mentioned to 
the jury in his opening statement that his client had never 
been arrested for any crime relating to the alleged incidents 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
School District. Stevens's attorney objected before Johnson's counsel 
began the inquiry, contending that the issue was far too remote in time 
and relevance to have any bearing on Stevens's credibility as a witness. 
The trial judge agreed, sustaining the objection because he thought the 
inquiry too "out in left field" to have any"immediate bearing on the 
case." Johnson argues that the District Court erred under Federal Rule 
of Evidence 608(b), which allows inquiry into specific instances of 
conduct that "concern[ ] the witness' character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness" during cross-examination. 
 
We review a district court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. 
See Abrams v. Lightolier Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1213 (3d Cir. 1995). 
Moreover, where the applicable evidentiary rule is itself discretionary, 
as 
it is here, see Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) (stating that specific instances of 
conduct "may" be inquired into "at the discretion of the court"), we give 
the trial court's ruling "substantial deference." Elcock v. Kmart Corp., 
233 
F.3d 734, 754 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Hurley v. Atlantic City Police 
Dep't, 
174 F.3d 95, 110 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
 
Although lying about the dean's list is arguably probative of Stevens's 
character for untruthfulness, the District Court acted within its 
discretion when it concluded that the remoteness in time of the incident 
-- Stevens submitted the resume more than nine years before the trial 
-- substantially diminished its probative value. See 4 Weinstein's Federal 
Evidence (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2001), S 608.22[2][c], at 
608-63 & nn.42-43 (noting that "remoteness in time" is a factor properly 
considered by the trial court in limiting cross-examination under Rule 
608(b)). Furthermore, the trial court was within its discretion to 
conclude 
that Stevens's lying on his resume, although duplicitous and wrong, was 
not so indicative of moral turpitude as to be particularly probative of 
his 
character for untruthfulness. See id. at 608-64 (recognizing "[t]he 
character of the previous conduct" as another factor properly considered 
by the trial court under Rule 608(b)). 
 
In addition to the Rule 608(b) argument, Johnson also contends that 
the questioning should have been allowed under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 405(b), which permits evidence of specific instances of conduct 
when "character or a trait of character of a person is an essential 
element of a charge, claim, or defense." This argument is misplaced, 
however, for Stevens's character is not an essential element of any of the 
charges against him. 
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with Johnson. The District Court, however, found that no 
new trial was warranted because the Court's prompt 
admonition to the jury to disregard the statement cured 
any potential prejudice. 
 
Second, as noted above, Johnson contends that the 
District Court erred in refusing to permit Radwanski to 
testify as to the touching incident with Stevens under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 415. Although it did not state so 
explicitly, it appears to us that the District Court excluded 
the evidence pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403's 
balancing inquiry, concluding that the slim probative value 
of Radwanski's testimony was outweighed by its potential 
for unfairly prejudicing Stevens, misleading the jury, 
confusing the issues, and wasting time. 
 
II. Remarks by Stevens's Counsel in His Opening 
Statement. 
 
Near the end of his opening statement, Stevens's attorney 
commented, "Betsy Sue Johnson reported [the allegations 
regarding Stevens] in July of 1995. She talked to the state 
police. No arrest." Shortly thereafter, upon the completion 
of Stevens's attorney's opening statement, Johnson's 
attorney approached the bench and objected to opposing 
counsel's mention of "[n]o arrest," asking the trial judge to 
declare a mistrial. The judge denied Johnson's motion, but 
indicated that he would instruct the jury to ignore what 
Stevens's counsel had just said. 
 
Soon thereafter the judge told the jury: 
 
       The one thing I do want to tell you as a result of[the 
       sidebar conference] is that the reference by Mr. 
       Mazzoni [Stevens's counsel] in his opening to what did 
       or did not happen to Mr. Stevens as a result of the 
       complaint being lodged with the police is immaterial in 
       this case. Forget about that. It has nothing to do with 
       your determination in this case as to what happened. 
 
After the jury returned its verdict in favor of Stevens, 
Johnson moved for a new trial in part based on her 
assertion that the District Court erred in denying her 
request for a mistrial. Johnson argued that the opposing 
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counsel's improper reference to "[n]o arrest" influenced the 
jury's verdict. The District Court disagreed, finding that the 
limited nature of the improper reference, as well as the 
clear and strong curative instructions given to the jury 
upon plaintiff 's objection, "rendered it extremely unlikely 
that the verdict, rendered three days later, was influenced 
in the slightest respect by the improper statement." 
 
We review the District Court's denial of a motion for a 
new trial for abuse of discretion. See Blanche Rd. Corp. v. 
Bensalem Twp., 57 F.3d 253, 264 (3d Cir. 1995). Such a 
deferential standard of review is appropriate because "the 
trial judge . . . is in a far better position than we to 
appraise the effect of the improper argument of counsel." 
Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 980 F.2d 171, 207 
(3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Reed v. Phila. Bethlehem & New 
England R.R. Co., 939 F.2d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 1991)). 
 
There is no doubt that the mention of "[n]o arrest" by 
Stevens's attorney was improper, for evidence of non-arrest, 
like evidence of nonprosecution or acquittal of a crime, is 
generally inadmissible in a civil trial concerning the same 
incident. See Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Sunshine 
Supermarket, Inc., 753 F.2d 321, 325 (3d Cir. 1985). This 
rule is primarily based on the fact that criminal and civil 
trials require different burdens of proof for proving guilt 
and liability, respectively. A decision not to arrest, 
therefore, may be based on law enforcement authorities' 
belief that they would be unable to prove to a jury beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
suspected crime, which does not necessarily indicate that a 
plaintiff cannot prove the same by a preponderance of the 
evidence in a civil trial. Furthermore, the decision not to 
arrest may take into account many factors irrelevant to a 
civil suit, such as the allocation of law enforcement 
resources and other considerations of prosecutorial 
discretion. See id. Because the probative value of evidence 
of non-arrest is very limited, courts exclude it in order to 
avoid the danger of the jury in a civil trial exaggerating its 
worth. Cf. 5 Weinstein's Federal Evidence (Joseph M. 
McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2001), S 803.28[7], at 803-134 
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(discussing the reasons for the exclusion of judgments of 
acquittal).3 
 
As an initial matter, it is important to recognize that the 
"[n]o arrest" comment, as part of Stevens's attorney's 
opening statement, was never formally admitted into  
evidence.4 Upon being alerted to the inappropriateness of 
the comment by Johnson's attorney, the trial judge swiftly 
moved to remedy the situation by instructing the jury to 
disregard this statement. The District Court, therefore, 
never endorsed as admissible the inappropriate comment of 
defense counsel. 
 
To be sure, there are exceptional situations in which a 
new trial should be granted due to an attorney's 
inappropriate remarks even when the trial judge issues 
curative instructions. This is because, as the Supreme 
Court recognized in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 
(1968), jury instructions to disregard particular statements 
can sometimes be "intrinsically ineffective" because the 
"nonadmissible declaration cannot be wiped from the 
brains of the jurors." Id. at 129 (quoting Delli Paoli v. United 
States, 352 U.S. 232, 247 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting)). 
 
Despite these concerns, our system of justice, 
particularly in the civil context, where the consequences of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Moreover, to the extent that a decision not to arrest is likely based 
on 
knowledge outside the personal experience of the law enforcement official 
responsible for the decision, it amounts to an inadmissible opinion 
under Federal Rules of Evidence 602 and 701. See Am. Home Assurance 
Co., 753 F.2d at 325. 
 
4. This is in contrast to cases like American Home and Galbraith v. 
Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 464 F.2d 225 (3d Cir. 1972), in which we 
reversed in part because the trial judges affirmatively permitted counsel 
to introduce evidence of nonprosecution. In American Home, for example, 
the plaintiff insurance company filed a motion in limine to prevent the 
introduction of evidence of nonprosecution for defendant's alleged arson. 
The trial court allowed the evidence to be introduced under certain 
circumstances, and we reversed, holding that "[t]he admission of this 
evidence" was error. 753 F.2d at 325. In Galbraith, the trial court 
allowed the defendant to testify as to his nonprosecution. 464 F.2d at 
226. We reversed, noting that this testimony was inadmissible and 
"highly prejudicial." Id. at 227. 
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jury error are not as grave as in the criminal setting, "relies 
upon the ability of the jury to follow instructions." Opper v. 
United States, 348 U.S. 84, 95 (1954). Even in the criminal 
context, exceptions to this general presumption are rare, 
made only when there is an "overwhelming probability that 
the jury will be unable to follow the court's instructions, 
and a strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence would 
be devastating to the defendant." Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 
756, 766 n.8 (1987) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). Consequently, because the District Court gave 
clear instructions promptly upon plaintiff 's objection to the 
mention of "[n]o arrest," we assume that the jury followed 
these instructions and ignored the inappropriate remark. 
We therefore conclude that the District Court did not abuse 
its discretion in declining to grant a mistrial in response to 
Stevens's attorney's improper remarks.5  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Moreover, the particular circumstances of this incident lead us to 
believe that it is not "reasonably probable that the verdict was 
influenced 
by prejudicial statements." Greenleaf v. Garlock, Inc., 174 F.3d 352, 363- 
64 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
Notably, the remark was an isolated incident occurring on the first day 
-- indeed, within the first hour -- of a four-day trial, and likely faded 
from the jurors' memories as the trial wore on. This fact distinguishes 
this case from others in which our sister courts of appeals have found 
that a new trial is warranted even when the trial judge instructed the 
jury to ignore counsel's prejudicial remarks. See Rabon v. Great 
Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 818 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1987) (counsel made 
repeated references to nonprosecution in his closing argument); Roberts 
v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 809 F.2d 1247, 1251 (6th Cir. 1987) 
(counsel emphasized nonprosecution in both his opening statement and 
closing argument, and was also permitted to question witnesses about 
the subject). 
 
Furthermore, the reference to non-arrest here was not particularly 
inflammatory, consisting only of the matter-of-fact utterance "[n]o 
arrest." By contrast, in Rabon, which was a civil arson trial, the 
defendant's attorney used the issue of nonprosecution to berate the 
plaintiff insurance company in his closing argument, making outrageous 
statements like, "They are asking you to do what they couldn't get done 
in criminal courts," and "[A]fter law enforcement investigated this 
matter, 
they dismissed the charges, and nobody has gone forward with it but 
[the insurance company's private investigator]." 818 F.2d at 308. The 
non-inflammatory nature of Stevens's counsel's remark makes it much 
more likely that the jury was able to heed the Court's instructions to 
ignore it. 
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III. Exclusion of Radwanski's Testimony Under 
Rule 415 
 
A. The Incident 
 
During the course of the trial, Johnson attempted to 
introduce the testimony of Karen Radwanski, a teacher's 
associate in the high school's restaurant training program 
and a friend of Stevens, regarding an incident in which 
Stevens allegedly sexually assaulted her in the office of 
another teacher, Tony Blaisure. Radwanski had just walked 
into the office carrying lunch when Stevens allegedly picked 
her up and threw her over his shoulder. According to 
Radwanski, who was wearing a skirt at the time, Stevens's 
hand went up her skirt and touched her in the crotch area 
while he raised her off the floor. Stevens soon let her down 
to the floor and the two of them, along with Blaisure, 
proceeded to sit down and eat lunch together. 
 
Whether Stevens's alleged touching of Radwanski's crotch 
was intentional or accidental is unclear from the record, as 
Radwanski offered somewhat inconsistent accounts of the 
incident. In her deposition Radwanski was asked whether 
Stevens's finger "linger[ed] . . . on [her] crotch for any 
period of time." She responded, "I have to say no." In an 
earlier interview conducted by Johnson's attorney outside 
the presence of opposing counsel, Radwanski, under oath, 
was asked if Stevens had "left his hand [on her crotch] for 
a while, a moment, two moments or so," to which she 
responded, "Yeah." When asked during her deposition 
whether she thought the touching was intentional, 
Radwanski seemed unsure: "I guess maybe at the time I 
didn't feel right, but I guess the greater part of me not 
wanting to think anything was just like, you know, 
shrugged it off, no big deal." 
 
B. The District Court's Ruling 
 
Federal Rule of Evidence 415 permits the introduction of 
evidence of a similar "offense . . . of sexual assault" in a 
civil trial in which a claim for damages, as in this case, "is 
predicated on a party's alleged commission of conduct 
constituting an offense of sexual assault. . . ." Pursuant to 
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this rule, Johnson sought to introduce Karen Radwanski's 
testimony as to the alleged touching incident in an effort to 
establish Stevens's propensity for sexual abuse. The 
District Court, however, refused to permit Radwanski to 
testify because it concluded that the touching incident did 
not qualify as an "offense of sexual assault" under the 
applicable definition provided by Rule 413(d).6 The District 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. As an alternative ground for excluding Radwanski's testimony, the 
District Court suggested that Johnson had failed to abide by Rule 415's 
disclosure requirement. We disagree. Rule 415(b) requires that: 
 
       A party who intends to offer evidence under this Rule shall 
disclose 
       the evidence to the party against whom it will be offered, 
including 
       statements of witnesses or a summary of the substance of any 
       testimony that is expected to be offered, at least fifteen days 
before 
       the scheduled date of trial or at such later time as the court may 
       allow for good cause. 
 
Johnson claimed that because defense counsel had been present at 
Radwanski's deposition, during which the touching incident had been 
inquired into by both parties, Stevens was fully aware that Radwanski 
was likely to testify as to the incident at trial, particularly because 
Johnson's pretrial memorandum, which was filed more than two years 
before the trial began, listed Radwanski as a witness and included 
Radwanski's deposition in its List of Exhibits. The District Court, 
however, found this argument unconvincing, appearing to conclude that 
Rule 415(b) required Johnson to provide some form of special 
notification of her intent to introduce past sexual assault evidence under 
Rule 415. Since Johnson had failed to provide any such special 
notification, she was precluded from presenting Radwanski's testimony. 
 
We acknowledge that there are some advantages to the District Court's 
interpretation of Rule 415(b), especially from the standpoint of trial 
management. Providing specific notice of an intent to present evidence 
under Rule 415 may prompt defense counsel to raise the issue in a 
pretrial motion in limine rather than in the midst of trial, thereby 
enabling the trial judge to focus more sharply on the issue. 
 
Despite these countervailing considerations, we think that in this case 
the primary purpose of Rule 415(b)'s disclosure provision -- preventing 
a plaintiff from unfairly surprising a defendant at trial with evidence of 
an alleged past offense of sexual assault -- was not offended. Cf. United 
States v. Carter, 756 F.2d 310, 311-12 (3d Cir. 1985) (declining to 
reverse conviction where government failed to provide list of "alibi 
rebuttal" witnesses to the defendant as required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.1 
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Court excluded the testimony without holding an in limine 
hearing on the matter, as requested by Johnson. 7 
 
The precise basis for the District Court's conclusion that 
the touching incident did not meet Rule 413's definition of 
an "offense of sexual assault" is not clear, as the Court did 
not make a formal finding on the issue. Rather, it resolved 
the matter in several statements that appear in the trial 
transcript. It appears from these passages and from the 
opinion accompanying the denial of Johnson's motion for a 
new trial that the Court was particularly troubled by 
concerns about the intentionality of Stevens's conduct. In 
its remarks on the record, the Court stated: 
 
       I think there's insufficient evidence that the touching 
       was in any way intentional. . . . It was obviously a part 
       of horseplay in the presence of another person, and the 
       conduct of the parties indicated at the time that it was 
       not viewed as an intentional touching of that area. 
 
As further evidence of the lack of intentional conduct on 
the part of Stevens, the Court considered it important that 
Radwanski declined to mention the incident to the state 
police when being interviewed in connection with Johnson's 
criminal complaint against Stevens. As the Court noted, "I 
have great uncertainty that [the touching incident] qualifies 
as a sexual assault under any of [Rule 413's] terms when 
[Radwanski] didn't think it was sufficiently offensive to tell 
the state police when she's being interviewed about this 
conduct." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
and this failure did not result in any "surprise" to the defendant at 
trial). 
Because defense counsel was present at Radwanski's deposition and 
questioned her specifically about the touching incident, we think that 
the evidence had been adduced in such a way that Stevens would 
reasonably understand its significance. Consequently, permitting 
Radwanski to testify as to the incident at trial would not have unfairly 
surprised Stevens, and we cannot say that Rule 415(b)'s disclosure 
provision was offended. 
 
7. Actually, at trial Johnson objected to the Court's refusal to hold an 
"in 
camera proceeding." We assume, however, that what Johnson was 
requesting was not an in camera proceeding but an in limine hearing. 
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While it did not do so in terms, our reading of the 
transcript persuades us that what the Court really did was 
to engage in a kind of balancing exercise, see  Fed. R. Evid. 
403, whereby it excluded the evidence because its slight 
probative value was outweighed by other factors such as 
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, and 
waste of time. 
 
C. History and Background of Rules 413-15 
 
Federal Rules of Evidence 413-15 are relatively recent 
additions to the Rules, adopted by Congress as part of the 
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. 
Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994). Evidence law 
has historically prohibited the admission into evidence of 
"other crimes, wrongs, or acts . . . to prove the character of 
a person in order to show action in conformity therewith." 
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Rules 413-15 establish exceptions to 
the general prohibition on character evidence in cases 
involving sexual assault and child molestation. Rules 413 
and 414 apply to criminal proceedings, while Rule 415 
applies to civil trials. 
 
Ever since their initial proposal, Rules 413-15 have been 
met with hostility by the legal establishment. See Judicial 
Conference of the U.S., Report of the Judicial Conference on 
the Admission of Character Evidence in Certain Sexual 
Misconduct Cases, 159 F.R.D. 51, 52 (1995) [hereinafter 
Judicial Conference Report] (observing the opposition of an 
"overwhelming majority of judges, lawyers, law professors, 
and legal organizations" to the proposed rules); Christopher 
B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Evidence Under the Rules 
475 (3d ed. 1996) (noting that "the professional reaction to 
[Rules 413-15] has been strongly negative"). Although 
Congress bypassed the ordinary rulemaking procedures 
when adopting Rules 413-15, the enacting legislation 
provided the Judicial Conference 150 days within which to 
make and submit alternative recommendations on the rules 
to Congress. The Judicial Conference's Advisory Committee 
on Evidence Rules, with what it noted was "highly unusual 
unanimity," ardently opposed the new rules, fearing that 
they "could diminish significantly the protections that have 
safeguarded persons accused in criminal cases and parties 
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in civil cases against undue prejudice." Judicial Conference 
Report, 159 F.R.D. at 53. Embracing the views of the 
Advisory Committee, the Conference recommended that 
Congress "reconsider its policy determinations underlying 
Evidence Rules 413-415" or, in the alternative, adopt 
amendments to Rules 404 and 405 proposed by the 
Advisory Committee. Id. at 54. Congress rejected both 
alternatives, and the rules stand today as originally 
enacted. 
 
D. Standards for Admission of Evidence under 
Rule 415 
 
In order for evidence of a past act to be admitted under 
Rule 415, the District Court must determine whether the 
act satisfies the applicable definition of an "offense of 
sexual assault" provided by Rule 413(d), which states: 
 
       For purposes of this rule and Rule 415, "offense of 
       sexual assault" means a crime under Federal law or 
       the law of a State . . . that involved -- 
 
       (1) any conduct proscribed by chapter 109A of title 
       18, United States Code; 
 
       (2) contact, without consent, between any part of the 
       defendant's body or an object and the genitals or 
       anus of another person; 
 
       (3) contact, without consent, between the genitals or 
       anus of the defendant and any part of another 
       person's body; 
 
       (4) deriving sexual pleasure or gratification from the 
       infliction of death, bodily injury, or physical pain on 
       another person; or 
 
       (5) an attempt or conspiracy to engage in conduct 
       described in paragraphs (1)-(4). 
 
Although the language of Rule 413(d) is ambiguous as to 
whether the past "offense of sexual assault" must be a 
conviction, the legislative history of Rules 413-15 indicates 
that Congress intended to allow admission not only of prior 
convictions for sexual offenses, but also of uncharged 
conduct. See 140 Cong. Rec. 23,603 (1994) (Statement of 
 
                                16 
  
Rep. Molinari) ("The practical effect of the new rules is to 
put evidence of uncharged offenses in sexual assault and 
child molestation cases on the same footing as other types 
of relevant evidence that are not subject to a special 
exclusionary rule.") (emphasis added); see also United 
States v. Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488, 1492 (10th Cir. 1997); 
2 Weinstein's Federal Evidence (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 
2d ed. 2001), S 413.03[1], at 413-6-7. But see 140 Cong. 
Rec. 15,209 (1994) (statement of Rep. Kyl) (stating that the 
new rules will not apply to "allegations" but only to "prior 
offenses" where "an accused has been convicted of similar 
conduct") (emphasis added). 
 
While uncharged conduct is admissible under Rule 415, 
some limits, of course, need to be placed on its 
admissibility in order to ensure that the plaintiff may not 
"parade past the jury a litany of potentially prejudicial 
similar acts that have been established or connected to the 
defendant only by unsubstantiated innuendo." Huddleston 
v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689 (1988). At the same 
time, for reasons of judicial efficiency and economy, the 
district court cannot be expected to conduct a "trial within 
a trial" to determine the veracity of the proffered evidence. 
So exactly what must a district court do before deciding 
whether to admit or exclude evidence of prior sexual 
assaults under Rules 413-15? The text of Rules 413-15 is 
silent on this issue, and the Supreme Court has never 
answered this question in the specific context of these 
rules. The Supreme Court has, however, in Huddleston, 
considered the same issue in the context of Federal Rule of 
Evidence 404(b), which allows for the introduction of 
evidence of "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" to prove issues 
other than character. 
 
In Huddleston, the prosecution introduced evidence of 
another act of the defendant in an attempt to prove his 
knowledge of the crime for which he was being tried, 
consistent with Rule 404(b). Arguing that "evidence of 
similar acts has a grave potential for causing improper 
prejudice," the defendant submitted that to avoid this 
danger the trial court must make a preliminary finding by 
a preponderance of the evidence under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 104(a) that the defendant committed the past act. 
 
                                17 
  
485 U.S. at 686-87. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous 
opinion, rejected the defendant's position, concluding "that 
a preliminary finding by the court that the Government has 
proved the act by a preponderance of the evidence is not 
called for under Rule 104(a)." Id. at 689. Instead, the Court 
identified Rule 104(b), which governs the relevancy of 
evidence conditioned on fact, as the applicable safeguard 
against the risk of introducing prejudicial unsubstantiated 
evidence. 
 
Huddleston identified Rule 104(b) as appropriate because 
the question of the defendant's commission of the past act 
"was simply one of conditional relevancy -- the relevancy of 
the bad act is conditioned on the defendant's having 
committed it." Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 388-89 
(Stephen A. Saltzburg et al. eds., 7th ed. 1998). Under Rule 
104(b), no preliminary finding is required; rather, the trial 
"court simply examines all the evidence in the case and 
decides whether the jury could reasonably find the 
conditional fact -- [whether the defendant committed the 
prior act] -- by a preponderance of the evidence." 
Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 690. 
 
To recapitulate, Huddleston does not require that a trial 
judge make a finding by a preponderance of the evidence; 
it simply requires the judge to ask whether "a jury could 
reasonably" make such a finding. Presumably, this once- 
removed determination of the trial judge lowers the burden 
for the party seeking to introduce the prior act evidence, 
although exactly by how much is hard to say, as the 
standard appears designed to provide the trial court 
substantial discretion in admitting conditionally relevant 
information. See id. at 690. 
 
In part because of the similarity between Rules 404(b) 
and Rules 413-15 -- both allow the admission of past acts, 
including uncharged conduct, albeit for different purposes 
-- the few courts and commentators that have considered 
the issue have concluded that Huddleston's standard for 
screening uncharged conduct applies to Rules 413-15. See 
United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1433 (10th Cir. 
1998); 2 Weinstein's Federal Evidence, S 413.03[1], at 413- 
7. As explained in the margin, we find this position 
somewhat problematic in light of the difference between the 
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types of evidence that are likely to be introduced under 
Rules 404(b) and 413-15: the former allows for the 
introduction of "other crimes, wrongs, or acts," whereas the 
latter allow evidence of offenses of sexual assault or child 
molestation.8 Were it within our power to select the better 
rule, therefore, we would be inclined to adopt the more 
exacting standard for the admission of past act evidence 
rejected by the Court in Huddleston: a preponderance of the 
evidence finding under Rule 104(a). We find ourselves 
constrained from doing so, however, by the texts of Rules 
413-15 as well as by their legislative history, which 
indicates that Congress intended that the Huddleston 
standard apply in this context. 
 
As noted above, the texts of Rules 413-15 are silent as to 
the appropriate standard for admitting evidence of past acts 
of sexual assault. Following the Court's reasoning in 
Huddleston, this silence alone is an important reason for 
not imposing a Rule 104(a) requirement on evidence 
introduced under Rules 413-15. In interpreting Rule 404(b), 
the Huddleston Court considered it important that Rule 
404(b)'s "text contains no intimation . . . that any 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. In our view, because of the severe social stigma attached to crimes of 
sexual assault and child molestation, evidence of these past acts poses 
a higher risk, on the whole, of influencing the jury to punish the 
defendant for the similar act rather than the charged act than the type 
of evidence that is often introduced under Rule 404(b). See Doe ex rel. 
Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 232 F.2d 1258, 1268 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting 
"the strong prejudicial qualities" of evidence submitted under Rule 415) 
(quoting United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326, 1330 (10th Cir. 
1998)). In light of this higher risk of unfair prejudice, we think the 
need 
to guard against the introduction of unsubstantiated evidence is greater, 
and would be best addressed by requiring the trial court to make a 
finding by a preponderance of the evidence under Rule 104(a). 
 
To be sure, certain past acts likely to be introduced under Rule 404(b) 
are similarly, if not more highly, stigmatized -- such as murders or 
assaults and batteries -- and thereby present a significant risk of 
inappropriate punishment. However, many, if not most, of the past acts 
introduced under Rule 404(b) -- e.g., burglaries, thefts, etc -- are not 
as 
potentially inflammatory as offenses of sexual assault or child 
molestation. On the whole, therefore, we believe that the risk of unfair 
prejudice is less in the Rule 404(b) context than in the context of Rules 
413-15. 
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preliminary showing is necessary," and that such a 
requirement was "nowhere apparent from the language of " 
the rule. 485 U.S. at 687-88. Similarly, Rules 413-15 do 
not contain any language indicating that a preliminary 
finding is necessary. 
 
Moreover, just as in Huddleston the Court noted that the 
legislative history counseled against imposing a Rule 104(a) 
finding requirement on evidence introduced under Rule 
404(b), see 485 U.S. at 688, the legislative history of Rules 
413-15 points to the same conclusion in this context. The 
principal sponsors of Rules 413-15, Representative Susan 
Molinari and Senator Robert Dole, declared in their floor 
statements supporting the new rules that an address 
delivered to the Evidence section of the Association of 
American Law Schools by David J. Karp -- then Senior 
Counsel at the Office of Policy Development at the 
Department of Justice and the drafter of Rules 413-15 -- 
was to serve as an "authoritative" part of the Rules' 
legislative history.9 140 Cong. Rec. 23,602 (1994) 
(statement of Rep. Molinari); 140 Cong. Rec. 24,799 (1994) 
(statement of Sen. Dole). In the referenced speech, Mr. Karp 
stated clearly that "the standard of proof with respect to 
uncharged offenses under the new rules would be governed 
by the Supreme Court's decision in Huddleston v. United 
States." Evidence of Propensity, 70 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. at 19. 
 
Representative Molinari's and Senator Dole's reference to 
a non-legislator's address is a somewhat unusual method 
of establishing "authoritative" legislative history.10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The address was reprinted as Evidence of Propensity and Probability in 
Sex Offense Cases and Other Cases, 70 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 15 (1994) 
[hereinafter Evidence of Propensity]. 
 
10. While relying on the work of a non-legislator is a somewhat unusual 
method of establishing legislative history, it is not entirely unknown. 
For 
instance, the portion of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995 that establishes the procedure for selecting a lead plaintiff and for 
choosing and retaining lead counsel in securities class actions, 15 U.S.C. 
S 78u-4(a)(3), was clearly based on a law review article by Professors 
Elliott J. Weiss and John S. Beckerman. See S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 11 
n.32 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 690 n.32 (stating that 
the article -- Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional 
Investors 
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Nevertheless, "[w]e are bound by the intent of Congress, as 
we perceive it," and it appears that this reference to Mr. 
Karp's address was intended by Congress as a guide to the 
judiciary in interpreting Rules 413-15.11  Sperling v. 
Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 24 F.3d 463, 470 (3d Cir. 1994). 
Moreover, we can find nothing in the legislative record to 
the contrary. Consequently, we conclude, albeit with some 
reluctance, see supra note 8, that Huddleston's standard 
for the admission of evidence applies to Rule 415. As such, 
a trial court considering evidence offered under Rule 415 
must decide under Rule 104(b) whether a reasonable jury 
could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the past 
act was an "offense of sexual assault" under Rule 413(d)'s 
definition and that it was committed by the defendant. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions , 104 Yale L. J. 2053 
(1995) -- "provided the basis for the `most adequate Plaintiff ' 
provision" 
of the PSLRA). Although Congress did not refer to the Weiss/Beckerman 
article as an "authoritative" part of the legislative history -- as 
Representative Molinari and Senator Dole did here with respect to Mr. 
Karp's address -- courts interpreting S 78u-4(a)(3) of the PSLRA have 
nevertheless taken note of Congress's heavy reliance on the 
Weiss/Beckerman article and given it considerable weight when 
construing the provision. See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 
201, 262 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 
Similarly, in enacting 11 U.S.C. S 510(b), which provides for the 
subordination of any claim for damages "arising from the purchase or 
sale" of a security of the debtor, Congress noted that it was relying 
heavily on a law review article written by Professors John J. Slain and 
Homer Kripke, The Interface Between Securities Regulation and 
Bankruptcy -- Allocating the Risk of Illegal Securities Issuance Between 
Securityholders and the Issuer's Creditors, 48 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 261 (1973). 
See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 196 (summarizing the argument in the 
Slain/Kripke article and stating that "[t]he bill generally adopts the 
Slain/Kripke position"). The courts construingS 510(b) have accordingly 
given considerable weight to the Slain/Kripke article. See, e.g., In re 
Granite Partners, 208 B.R. 332, 336 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("Any 
discussion of section 510(b) must begin with the 1973 law review article 
authored by Professors John J. Slain and Homer Kripke . . . ."). 
 
11. Judge Alito agrees that Huddleston applies here for essentially the 
same reasons given in Huddleston, and he expresses no view on whether 
this is the best procedure in this situation and does not rely on Mr. 
Karp's speech, which is discussed supra. 
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Even if a trial court is satisfied that the proffered past act 
evidence satisfies Rule 104(b), however, it may still exclude 
it under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which allows for 
evidence to "be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence." Initially, there was 
some doubt as to whether Rule 403's balancing inquiry was 
at all applicable to Rules 413-15. Because the rules state 
that evidence of past sexual offenses "is admissible," some 
commentators, including the Judicial Conference Advisory 
Committee on the Rules of Evidence, interpreted this 
language as possibly indicating that the admission of past 
sexual offense evidence is mandatory, unconstrained by 
Rule 403's prejudice inquiry. Judicial Conference Report, 
159 F.R.D. at 53.12 
 
It appears from the legislative history of Rules 413-15, 
however, that despite the seemingly absolutist tone of the 
"is admissible" language, Congress did not intend for the 
admission of past sexual offense evidence to be mandatory; 
rather, Congress contemplated that Rule 403 would apply 
to Rules 413-15. See, e.g., 140 Cong. Rec. 24,799 (1994) 
(Statement of Sen. Dole) ("[T]he general standards of the 
rules of evidence will continue to apply [to Rules 413-15], 
including . . . the court's authority under rule 403 to 
exclude evidence whose probative value is substantially 
outweighed by its prejudicial effect.").13  
 
Having concluded that Rule 403 is applicable to Rules 
413-15, we now turn to the manner in which the balancing 
inquiry ought to be performed. Relying on the legislative 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. While we express no view on the matter, we note that a policy of 
mandatory admission, particularly in the criminal context, has been 
thought to raise serious constitutional concerns under the Due Process 
Clause. See Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1430; Judicial Conference Report, 159 
F.R.D. at 53. 
 
13. While we again express no view on the matter, we note that the 
presence of the Rule 403 safeguard has served to assuage the concerns 
of at least one of our sister courts of appeals, the Tenth Circuit, 
regarding the constitutionality of Rules 413-15 under the Due Process 
Clause. See Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1433. 
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history, a number of courts and commentators have 
concluded that Rule 403 should be applied to Rules 413-15 
with a thumb on the scale in favor of admissibility. See 
United States v. Larson, 112 F.3d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1997) 
("With respect to the Rule 403 balancing . . . the sponsors 
[of Rules 413-15] stated that `[t]he presumption is that the 
evidence admissible pursuant to these rules is typically 
relevant and probative, and that its probative value is not 
outweighed by any risk of prejudice.' ") (quoting 140 Cong. 
Rec. S12,990 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1994) (Statement of Sen. 
Dole)); see also United States v. LeCompte, 131 F.3d 767, 
769 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting the "strong legislative judgment 
that evidence of prior sexual offenses should ordinarily be 
admissible"). Indeed, in his speech that is referenced as 
part of the "authoritative" legislative history of Rules 413- 
15, David Karp observed that there is "an underlying 
legislative judgment . . . that the sort of evidence that is 
admissible pursuant to proposed Rules 413-15 is typically 
relevant and probative, and that its probative value is 
normally not outweighed by any risk of prejudice or other 
adverse considerations." Evidence of Propensity, 70 Chi.- 
Kent L. Rev. at 19. 
 
In our view, this characterization of the role of Rule 403 
is overly simplified. It makes sense when the past act 
sought to be introduced under Rules 413-15 is 
demonstrated with specificity, see Enjady, 134 F.3d at 
1433 (identifying "how clearly the prior act has been 
proved" as a factor to be considered in assessing the 
probative value of evidence of past sexual assaults), and is 
sufficiently similar to the type of sexual assault allegedly 
committed by the defendant. See United States v. Guardia, 
135 F.3d 1326, 1331 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that"the 
similarity of the prior acts" to the acts at issue in the case 
is a factor to be considered in determining their probative 
value). In these archetypal cases, where the propensity 
inference that can be drawn from the past act evidence is 
greatest, Congress surely intended for the probative value 
of the evidence to outweigh its prejudicial effect, and, 
conversely, did not want Rule 403 factors such as undue 
delay, waste of time, confusion of the issues, etc., to justify 
exclusion. See, e.g., 140 C.R. 15,209 (1994) (Statement of 
Rep. Kyl) (recognizing as the archetypal case one in which 
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"there is a clear pattern of conduct by an accused who has 
been convicted of similar conduct") (emphases added). 
 
In other cases, however, where the past act is not 
substantially similar to the act for which the defendant is 
being tried, and/or where the past act cannot be 
demonstrated with sufficient specificity, the propensity 
inference provided by the past act is weaker, and no 
presumption in favor of admissibility is warranted. Where a 
past act cannot be shown with reasonable certainty, its 
probative value is reduced and it may prejudice the 
defendant unfairly, confuse the issues, mislead the jury, 
and result in undue delay and wasted time -- all reasons 
for excluding evidence under Rule 403. The same can be 
said of evidence of past acts that are dissimilar to the act 
for which the defendant is being tried; in particular, the 
introduction of dissimilar past acts runs the risk of 
confusing the issues in the trial and wasting valuable time. 
Also relevant to the Rule 403 balancing analysis are the 
additional factors recognized by the Tenth Circuit in 
Guardia: "the closeness in time of the prior acts to the 
charged acts, the frequency of the prior acts, the presence 
or lack of intervening events, and the need for evidence 
beyond the testimony of the defendant and alleged victim." 
135 F.3d at 1330 (internal citations omitted). 
 
Finally, it bears repeating that despite these general 
guidelines, the Rule 403 balancing inquiry is, at its core, an 
essentially discretionary one that gives the trial court 
significant latitude to exclude evidence. See Elcock v. Kmart 
Corp., 233 F.3d 734, 754 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
E. Discussion 
 
Johnson contends that Radwanski's testimony as to the 
touching incident with Stevens qualified as an "offense of 
sexual assault" under Rules 413 and 415, and that the 
District Court therefore erred in excluding it. Moreover, at 
trial she objected to the fact that the Court did not hold an 
in limine hearing on the matter. We apply the legal 
standards described above, and review the District Court's 
evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, see Abrams v. 
Lightolier Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1213 (3d Cir. 1995), although 
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our review of the Court's interpretation of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence is plenary. See United States v. Brown, 254 
F.3d 454, 458 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 
The District Court correctly noted that in order for the 
touching incident to qualify as an "offense of sexual 
assault" under Rule 413(d)'s definition, Pennsylvania law, 
as we explain in the margin, requires that the touching 
have been done intentionally.14 As described in Part I, 
supra, Radwanski gave conflicting descriptions of the 
incident. In one account she implied that Stevens's hand 
merely brushed by her crotch as he lifted her off the 
ground; in another she indicated that his hand lingered on 
her crotch for a moment or two. See supra at 12. When 
asked during her deposition whether she thought the 
touching incident was intentional, Radwanski replied, "I 
guess maybe at the time it didn't feel right, but I guess the 
greater part of me not wanting to think anything just was 
like, you know, just shrugged it off, no big deal."15 
 
In deciding to exclude Radwanski's testimony, the 
District Court did not indicate what standard for admission 
it was applying to the evidence. In keeping with Huddleston, 
the Court was not obliged to hold an in limine  hearing, as 
requested by Johnson, or make a formal finding under Rule 
104(a) when excluding the evidence.16 Under Huddleston, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Stevens's touching of Radwanski might be considered a crime of 
"indecent assault" under Pennsylvania law, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
S 3126(a)(1-2), which is defined as consisting of "indecent contact." 
"Indecent contact," in turn, is defined as touching "for the purpose of 
arousing or gratifying sexual desire in either person." 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. S 3101. The "for the purpose of " language of the indecent assault 
statute clearly establishes that the conduct underlying an offense must 
have been intentional. 
 
15. We are aware that victims of sexual assault are often hesitant to 
report their assailants for a variety of reasons. See United States 
Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Crime 
Victimization Survey (2000) (noting that in 1999"rape or sexual assault 
was [the violent crime] least often reported to law enforcement (28%)"). 
Indeed, for this reason we do not place too much emphasis on the fact 
that Radwanski did not report the touching incident to the state police 
when they interviewed her in response to Johnson's criminal complaint 
against Stevens, a factor relied on by the District Court. 
16. Although an in limine hearing is not required, district courts might 
find this a useful technique for considering the admission of evidence 
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the Court needed only to ask itself whether a jury could 
reasonably find by a preponderance of the evidence that 
Stevens committed the act intentionally, provided that the 
Court was satisfied that the evidence need not be excluded 
under Rule 403. Although the Court did not say so 
explicitly, it appears to us that the Court concluded that 
Radwanski's testimony did not satisfy Rule 403, and it 
accordingly -- and appropriately -- bypassed the 
Huddleston reasonable jury determination. 
 
The basis for the Court's Rule 403 determination seems 
to have been that Radwanski's equivocal testimony was 
insufficiently specific as to the intentionality of Stevens's 
conduct. The District Court stated, "I think there's 
insufficient evidence that the touching was in any way 
intentional. . . .". Lacking more specific evidence of 
intentionality, the Court apparently concluded that the 
probative value of the evidence was slight and was 
outweighed by Rule 403's concerns of prejudice, undue 
delay, waste of time, etc. This judgment appears to us to be 
sound given the equivocal nature of Radwanski's testimony 
as regarding the intentionality of Stevens's conduct.17 
 
(Text continued on page 28) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
proffered under Rule 415. Moreover, while a formal"finding" under Rule 
104(a) is not required, it would be helpful to our reviewing function if 
district courts would state explicitly their reasons for admitting or 
excluding evidence under Rules 413-15. See Glanzer, 232 F.3d at 1269 
(exhorting the trial court to "make a clear record concerning its decision 
whether or not to admit such evidence"). The failure of the District Court 
to be more precise in this case is probably explained by the relative 
newness of Rule 415. Indeed, this is the first opinion we have written on 
Rules 413-15 since their promulgation in 1995. 
 
17. In addition to its concerns about the intentionality of Stevens's 
conduct, the District Court also expressed some worry about the fact 
that Stevens did not touch Radwanski on the skin, but rather touched 
her through her clothing. The Court noted: 
 
       So it would have to again be 413(d)(2). I started to read, contact 
       without consent between any part of the defendant's body or an 
       object in the genitals or anus of another person. Now, the fact 
that 
       there was a touching of the crotch, presumably she was clothed and 
       unlike the testimony in our case, the Johnson case, there -- this 
       does not indicate that there was a touching actually of the 
genitals 
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       themselves as opposed to the crotch area. That may be a fine 
       distinction, but there is that distinction between that testimony. 
 
It appears to us that the District Court thought that the touching 
incident would not qualify as an "offense of sexual assault" under Rule 
413(d)'s definition because it did not fit within subsection (2)'s 
reference 
to "contact, without consent, between any part of the defendant's body 
. . . and the genitals . . . of another person." Assuming without deciding 
that touching through the clothing would not meet the requirements of 
subsection (2) by its literal terms, touching through the clothing does 
satisfy the requirements of another subsection of Rule 413(d) -- 
subsection (1), which refers to "any conduct proscribed by chapter 109A 
of title 18, United States Code." 
 
Chapter 109A includes 18 U.S.C. S 2244, which proscribes "abusive 
sexual contact." Subsection (b) of S 2244 makes it a criminal offense to 
"knowingly engage[ ] in sexual contact with another person without that 
other person's permission." (Emphasis added). 18 U.S.C. S 2246 makes 
clear that "sexual contact" for the purposes of S 2244's "abusive sexual 
contact" offense includes touching "either directly or through the 
clothing, 
of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of any 
person with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or 
gratify the sexual desire of any person." (Emphasis added). The fact that 
Stevens may have touched Radwanski through the clothing, therefore, 
does not preclude the act from qualifying as a sexual offense, provided, 
of course, that it meets Rule 413(d)'s threshold requirement of being "a 
crime under Federal law or the law of a State." 
 
Under the law of Pennsylvania, skin-to-skin touching is not a 
requirement for the commission of a crime of sexual assault. 
Pennsylvania law defines "indecent assault" in relevant part as 
consisting of "indecent contact" without the complainant's consent or by 
forcible compulsion. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 3126(a)(1-2). "Indecent 
contact" is defined as "[a]ny touching of the sexual or other intimate 
parts of the person for the purposes of arousing or gratifying sexual 
desire, in either person." 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 3101. Unlike its 
federal counterpart, Pennsylvania's statutory definition of "indecent 
contact" does not explicitly mention whether such contact includes 
touching through the clothing. Nevertheless, the Pennsylvania courts 
interpreting "indecent contact" have concluded that this term 
encompasses touching through the clothing. See Commonwealth v. Ricco, 
437 Pa. Super. 629, 634 (1994) (concluding that touching through the 
clothing may be considered "indecent contact" and rejecting a per se rule 
requiring "skin-to-skin" contact); In the Interest of M.S., a Minor, 10 
Pa. 
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Additionally, we find the exclusion of the evidence 
justifiable for a reason not stressed by the District Court: 
the differences between Stevens's alleged assaults of 
Radwanski and Johnson. The former occurred in another 
teacher's office with that teacher present, involved an adult 
co-worker of Stevens, and consisted of a bizarre incident in 
which Stevens lifted Radwanski off the ground and placed 
her on his shoulders. The latter is said to have taken place 
with no one else present in Stevens's office, involved a 
minor to whom Stevens served as guidance counselor, and 
allegedly involved Stevens making more direct sexual 
advances upon a much younger female. In our view, these 
dissimilarities reduced significantly the probative value of 
Radwanski's testimony. The case law is in accord. See, e.g., 
Doe ex rel. Glanzer v. Rudy-Glanzer, 232 F.3d 1258, 1269- 
70 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding exclusion of prior sexual 
assault evidence as too dissimilar because of age difference 
between victims and the dissimilar circumstances of the 
alleged misconduct). 
 
We also consider it relevant that the alleged touching of 
Radwanski appears to have been an isolated incident. 
Although Johnson presented evidence of rumors of Stevens 
acting inappropriately around female students in her 
attempt to attach S 1983 liability to the Administration, see 
supra note 1, during her trial against Stevens she did not 
attempt to present any other evidence of offenses of sexual 
assault allegedly perpetrated by Stevens besides the lone 
incident with Radwanski. While the isolated nature of the 
incident alone would probably not be enough to warrant 
excluding it, we nevertheless consider it a relevant factor 
supporting the District Court's decision. See Guardia, 135 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
D. & C. 4th 282, 283 (1990) ("The [`indecent contact'] element of 
`touching' can be established even though the private parts of the victim 
are touched over the clothing."). 
 
In sum, the mere fact that Radwanski alleged to have been touched 
through her clothing and not directly on her skin does not preclude the 
incident from qualifying as an "offense of sexual assault" under Rule 
413(d)'s definition. Hence, to the extent that the District Court's 
comment indicates that it excluded Radwanski's testimony on the basis 
of this factor, it was in error, though not error of consequence. 
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F.3d at 1331 (recognizing "the frequency of the prior acts" 
as a factor in determining the evidence's probative value). 
 
In sum, the uncertainty of the testimony regarding 
intentionality, the dissimilarities between the similar and 
alleged acts, and the isolated nature of the Radwanski 
incident reduced significantly the probative value of 
Radwanski's testimony. Given this reduced probative value, 
any presumption in favor of admissibility was unwarranted, 
and the District Court's exclusion of the evidence can be 
justified on grounds that its introduction might have 
prejudiced Stevens unfairly, misled the jury, confused the 
issues, and wasted valuable trial time. Accordingly, we 
cannot say that the Court abused its discretion in 
excluding Radwanski's testimony. 
 
Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court's order granting summary judgment to the 
Administration and its order denying Johnson's motion for 
a new trial. 
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